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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
A. Introduction. 
 North Idaho Resorts, LLC (“NIR”) appeals the award of discretionary costs and costs as a 
matter of right to Valiant Idaho, LLC (“Valiant”) in Bonner County Case No. CV-2009-1810 
(“Valiant Foreclosure”).  In a Memorandum Decision Order Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees to 
Valiant Idaho, LLC (“Memorandum Awarding Costs”) and the subsequently entered Judgment 
Re: Costs and Attorneys’ Fees, copies of which are attached and identified as Exhibit A 
[R.Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5829-43 and pp. 5844-46, respectively], the district court awarded Valiant costs 
against NIR in the total amount of $10,369.93.  R.Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5829–46.  This award is 
comprised of 25% of the total discretionary costs awarded to Valiant (i.e., $32,464.70 x .25 = 
$8,116.18) and 25% of the costs as a matter of right awarded to Valiant (i.e., $9,014.99 x .25 = 
$2,253.75).  Id.  This award was satisfied at a sheriff’s sale held on November 15, 2016 by payment 
in the full amount of the award plus interest and sheriff’s costs.  R.Vol. LX, pp. 7411–12.  
Although NIR did not object to Valiant’s Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys’ Fees 
(“Valiant Fee Memo”) filed July 6, 2015, NIR now contends that the award of discretionary costs 
was an abuse of discretion because the district court failed to: (1) perceive its award as a matter 
of discretion; (2) establish that said costs were exceptional and should be awarded to Valiant in the 
interest of justice; and (3) reach its determination through an exercise of reason.  NIR’s arguments 
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B. Pertinent Facts And Procedural History. 
1. The Idaho Club. 
 The Valiant Foreclosure is an exceptionally complex real estate foreclosure lawsuit arising 
out of a failed golf course and residential housing development project located in Sandpoint, Idaho 
and commonly known as “The Idaho Club.”  Valiant’s interests in The Idaho Club arise out of three 
mortgages that were assigned to it by RE Loans, LLC (“RE Loans Mortgage”), Pensco Trust Co. 
f/b/o Barney Ng (“Pensco Mortgage”) and Mortgage Fund ‘08, LLC (“MF08 Mortgage”) 
(collectively, “Valiant Mortgages”).  R.Vol. XXII, pp. 2562–66.  NIR’s interest in The Idaho Club 
arises out of a vendor’s lien (“Vendor’s Lien”) that it purportedly obtained by selling certain property 
to Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC (“POBD”), the developer of The Idaho Club.  
Id., pp. 2568–69; R.Vol. XXV, p. 2960.   
2. The Valiant Foreclosure. 
 The failure of the development spawned a multitude of interrelated civil lawsuits, 
including the Valiant Foreclosure, and: (a) Sage Holdings LLC, et. al. v. Pend Oreille Bonner 
Development, LLC, et. al. (Bonner County Case No. CV-2010-2142); (b) ACI Northwest, Inc. v. 
Bar-K, Inc., et. al. (Bonner County Case No. CV 2010-2211); (c) Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. 
Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC, et. al. (Bonner County Case No. CV-2011-0135); 
(d) The Idaho Club Homeowner’s Association, Inc. v. Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC, 
et. al. (Bonner County Case No. CV-2011-2284); and (e) The State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Board v. Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC, et. al. (Bonner County Case No. CV-2012-0008). 
R.Vol. XLI, pp. 5021–23.  Valiant and NIR were parties in each of these lawsuits. 
 The Valiant Foreclosure is by far the most complex of the lawsuits arising out of 
The Idaho Club.  It began as a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action filed October 13, 2009 by the 
contractor who constructed the golf course.  R.Vol. I, pp. 172–96.  After two years of motion practice 
and an almost two-year long bankruptcy stay1, Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice.  
See R.Vol. II, pp. 275–83, pp. 284–89, pp. 325–29; R.Vol. III, pp. 374–77, pp. 383–85.  
Motion practice resumed for approximately another year before Valiant filed its 
Counterclaim, Cross-claim and Third Party Complaint For Judicial Foreclosure on August 19, 2014 
(“Valiant Cross-claim”) and the case morphed into the judicial foreclosure of the Valiant Mortgages. 
R.Vol. VI, pp. 739–66; R.Vol. X, pp. 1164–67. 
 The Valiant Cross-Claim sought an adjudication that Valiant’s interests, vis a vis the 
Valiant Mortgages, were prior in right, title and interest to any interest claimed by no less than 
twenty-eight (28) other persons or entities named as a counter-defendant, cross-defendant or 
third-party defendant.  R.Vol. VI, pp. 741–45.  Valiant obtained default judgments or reached 
stipulations as to Valiant’s priority with the counter-defendant and all but two cross-defendants.   
 
                                                 
1 The first bankruptcy stay was entered on September 29, 2011 and the second bankruptcy stay was lifted on 
August 12, 2013.  R.Vol. II, pp. 275–89; R.Vol. III, pp. 374–77.  As such, a bankruptcy stay was in effect for 
1 year, 10 months and 15 days. 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Valiant prevailed on summary judgment against NIR.  Lastly, Valiant prevailed at trial against the 
other remaining cross-defendant (JV L.L.C. [“JV”]) and third-party defendant (VP, Incorporated 
[“VP”]). 
3. Subordination of NIR’s Alleged Vendor’s Lien. 
 On January 20, 2015, Valiant filed its Motion For Summary Judgment Against JV, 
NIR and VP (“Valiant SJ”).  R.Vols. XIV–XVII, pp. 1720–2069.  The Valiant SJ sought 
adjudication as a matter of law that the Valiant Mortgages were prior in right, title and interest to any 
interest possessed by NIR.  R.Vol. XIV, p. 1741.  On April 14, 2015, the district court granted 
Valiant’s SJ Motion.  R.Vol. XXII, p. 2560. 
 NIR’s appeal does not challenge the propriety of the district court’s memorandum decision 
granting the Valiant SJ.  Id., pp. 2560–78.  The district court ruled that NIR’s alleged Vendor’s Lien 
was subordinate to Valiant’s first-priority mortgage (i.e., the RE Loans Mortgage) because 
“NIR executed and recorded a Subordination Agreement, which subordinated any interest NIR had in 
the Idaho Club Property to the 2007 RE Loans Mortgage.”  Id., p. 2573.  The district court further 
ruled that NIR’s alleged Vendor’s Lien was subordinate to Valiant’s second-priority and 
third-priority mortgages (i.e., the Pensco Mortgage and the MF08 Mortgage) because 
“the Partial Termination recorded on March 15, 2007, and re-recorded on March 11, 2009, 
terminated the Memorandum of Sale [i.e., the Vendor’s Lien] as to the property encumbered by the 
Pensco Mortgage and MF08 Mortgage.”  Id.  Moreover, the district court noted that another 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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district court (in Bonner County Case No. CV 2011-0135) had already determined that NIR’s 
Vendor’s Lien “was paid in full and had no value.”  Id., p. 2573, fn. 3. 
 On June 16, 2015, NIR filed a Renewed Motion For Reconsideration and Consideration 
(“Renewed Motion”).  R.Vol. XXIV, p. 2781.  On July 21, 2015, the district court denied NIR’s 
Renewed Motion and reiterated that “the vendor’s lien that Judge Griffin held to have no force and 
effect because it was paid in full is the same vendor’s lien relied upon by NIR in this case.  
Thus . . . NIR is collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of the alleged vendor’s lien.”  
Id., pp. 2872–73.  NIR’s appeal does not contest the propriety of the district court’s memorandum 
decision denying NIR’s Renewed Motion.  Id., pp. 2871–73. 
On August 19, 2015, NIR filed its second motion to reconsider.  R.Vol. XXVII, p. 3114.  
On October 30, 2015, the district court, inter alia, denied this motion in its entirety.  R.Vol. XXXIII, 
pp. 4000–19.  NIR did not appeal the district court’s decision. 
4. The Valiant Foreclosure Was Factually and Legally Complex. 
 As this Court is aware, most judicial foreclosures are straight forward and involve one 
property owner and one lender seeking to foreclose its mortgage against a single parcel of 
real property.  Other judicial foreclosures are more complex; involving multiple lienholders and/or 
multiple parcels of real property.  The more lienholders and parcels of real property that are involved, 
the more complex the judicial foreclosure becomes.  The Valiant Foreclosure involved no less than 
twenty-nine (29) parties, including Valiant, asserting liens against The Idaho Club.  R.Vol. VI, 
pp. 741–45.  Moreover, one hundred fifty-six (156) parcels of real property are subject to some or all 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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of the Valiant Mortgages.  R.Vol. XLIV, pp. 5317–5412; R.Vol. XLV, pp. 5413–5502.  
Thus, the Valiant Foreclosure is unusually complex just from this standpoint. 
 The Valiant Foreclosure is made even more complex because the Valiant Mortgages did not 
describe the same properties.  Id.  Accordingly, Valiant had to establish which parcels were subject 
to each of the Valiant Mortgages.  Id.  As set forth in the Judgment and the Decree of Foreclosure, 
certain parcels were subject to only one of the mortgages, other parcels were subject to two of 
the mortgages, and still other parcels were subject to all three of the Valiant Mortgages.  Id.  
 The motion practice in this case was also exceptionally complex.  Valiant prevailed on a total 
of five different dispositive motions, including its SJ Motion against NIR.  See R.Vol. IV, p. 488; 
R.Vol. V, pp. 636–42; R.Vol. V, pp. 647–52; R.Vol. XXII, pp. 2560–78; R.Vol. XXIV, pp. 2791–98; 
R.Vol. XXXII, pp. 4000–19.  Even though Valiant prevailed on all of its dispositive motions, 
NIR, VP and JV refused to accept certain of the district court’s determinations. NIR, VP and JV 
collectively filed no less than six (6) motions to reconsider.  See R.Vol. XXII, p. 2596; R.Vol. XXIV, 
p. 2781; R.Vol. XXVII, p. 3114; R.Vol. XXII, p. 2579; R.Vol. XXV, p. 2967; R. Vol. XXIX, 
p. 3386.  Valiant prevailed in whole or in part on all of these motions, including the three (3) motions 
to reconsider filed jointly by NIR and VP.  See R.Vol. XXIV, pp. 2856–79; R.Vol. XXX, 
pp. 3527-32; R.Vol. XXXII, pp. 4000–19.  NIR did not prevail on any aspect of any of its motions 
to reconsider.  Id. 
 Valiant’s claims against NIR were decided on summary judgment.  Id.  However, certain of 
Valiant’s claims against VP and JV had to be decided at trial.  Valiant prevailed at the bi-furcated 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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four (4) day trial.  R.Vol. XXXVII, pp. 4589–4618.  Ultimately, Valiant was awarded a judgment 
against POBD in the total amount of $21,485,212.26.  R.Vol. XLV, pp. 5413–16.  
The Valiant Mortgages were adjudicated to be prior in right, title and interest to any interest 
possessed by the counter-defendant, cross-defendants, and third-party defendant in this case, 
including NIR.  Id.  The district court entered the Decree of Foreclosure entitling Valiant to sell 
one hundred fifty-six (156) parcels of real property subject to the Valiant Mortgages at a 
sheriff’s sale to pay the judgment amounts.  R.Vol. XLIV, pp. 5317–5412. 
 On July 6, 2015, Valiant filed its Fee Memo.  R.Vol. XLI, pp. 5019–57.  NIR did not file an 
objection to the Valiant Fee Memo.  The district court awarded Valiant costs and attorneys’ fees 
against: (a) POBD in the amount of $731,275.48; (b) NIR in the amount of $10,369.93; (c) JV in the 
amount of $15,554.88; and (d) VP in the amount of $15,554.88.  Valiant also filed a motion for 
sanctions against NIR, VP and JV, which was denied.  R.Vol. XLVII, pp. 5770–86. 
 
II. 




ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL 
 
 Valiant requests attorneys’ fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121 and the corresponding 
procedural mechanism, Idaho Appellate Rule 41, because NIR’s appeal was brought frivolously, 
unreasonably and without foundation.  Additional argument concerning Valiant’s request for 
attorneys’ fees is set forth hereinbelow Section IV.D.  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 






A. Standard Of Review. 
 The Idaho Supreme Court has long held that the grant or denial of discretionary costs is 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will only be reviewed by an appellate court 
for an abuse of that discretion.  Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493, 960 P.2d 175, 176 (1998).  
In reviewing whether a district court abused its discretion in awarding discretionary costs, 
the appellate court reviews: 
(1) Whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as 
discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries 
of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards; and 
(3) whether the trial court reached its decision through an exercise 
of reason. 
 
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 313, 109 P.3d 161, 167 (2005), overruled on 
other grounds by Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 152 Idaho 495, 497, 272 P.3d 467, 
469 (2012).  A trial court may award discretionary costs to the prevailing party where there has been 
“a showing that the costs are necessary and exceptional, reasonably incurred, and should in the 
interests of justice be assessed against the adverse party.”  Id. at 314, 109 P.3d at 168.  The party 
opposing an award of discretionary costs bears the burden of demonstrating there was an abuse of 
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B. The District Court’s Award Of Discretionary Costs Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion. 
 NIR asserts that the district court’s award of discretionary costs in favor of Valiant was an 
abuse of discretion.  As NIR has failed to meet its burden of proof, its arguments should be rejected 
and the district court’s decision should be upheld. 
1. NIR Did Not Object to the Valiant Fee Memo. 
 Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires the party objecting to a 
memorandum of costs to file an objection within fourteen (14) days of the date of service.  Id.  
Moreover, “failure to timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs constitutes a waiver of 
all objections to the costs claimed.”  Id.  The Idaho Supreme Court upheld this strict requirement in 
Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 475–76, 36 P.3d 218, 
227–28 (2001). 
 The respondent in Great Plains filed its memorandum of costs on June 3, 1999, 
upon remittitur issued by this Court.  Id. at 469–70, 36 P.3d at 221–22.  The hearing on any 
objections to the memorandum of costs was set for September 7, 1999.  The appellant filed its 
objection on the date of the hearing and filed its brief and supplemental authorities supporting its 
objections after the hearing.  Id.  The district court awarded respondent attorneys’ fees, costs as a 
matter of right, and discretionary costs.  Id.  The appellant appealed this decision to the 
Idaho Supreme Court, which upheld the award of fees and costs ruling that the appellant had waived 
any objections to the respondent’s memorandum of costs by failing to timely object as required by 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id. at 475–76, 36 P.3d at 227–28.  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF | Page 10 
I:\10482.006\PLD\Brief 180109.docx 
 Valiant filed the Valiant Fee Memo on July 6, 2015.  R.Vol. XLI, p. 5019.  The Valiant 
Fee Memo specifically requested an award of discretionary costs against NIR.  Id. at 5052–55.  
Although JV and VP filed objections, NIR did not.  See R.Vol. XLIV, p. 5306 and R.Vol. XLV, 
p. 5503.  As such, NIR waived any objection that it may have had to an award of discretionary costs 
in favor of Valiant.  The district court’s award of discretionary costs should be upheld.  
In the interest of full disclosure, it is worth noting that NIR and VP were represented by the 
same counsel; thus, it could be argued that VP’s objection to the award of discretionary costs should 
also apply to NIR.  However, Rule 54(d)(5) is clear: “Failure to timely object to the items in the 
memorandum of costs constitutes a waiver of all objections to the costs claimed.”  I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). 
This Court has enforced the strict time requirements imposed by the rules notwithstanding a party’s 
ignorance or misinterpretation thereof.  See Harrison v. Bd. of Prof’l Discipline, 145 Idaho 179, 183, 
177 P.3d 393, 397 (2008) (“Considering the circumstances of this case, ignorance or 
misinterpretation of the rules’ requirements based on a mistaken and narrow reading . . . is not 
good cause . . . for their failure to comply with the timely service requirement of I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2).”); 
Sammis v. MagneTek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 348, 941 P.2d 314, 320 (1997). 
2. The District Court’s Award of Discretionary Costs Was Appropriate. 
 Even if NIR’s objection to Valiant’s Fee Memo had been timely, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it awarded Valiant $8,116.18 in discretionary costs.  R.Vol. XLVIII, 
pp. 5844–46.  NIR bears the burden of establishing that the award was an abuse of discretion.  
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 313, 109 P.3d 161, 167 (2005), overruled on 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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other grounds by Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 152 Idaho 495, 497, 272 P.3d 467, 
469 (2012).  To establish an abuse of discretion, NIR must show: (a) the district court failed to 
recognize that an award of discretionary costs was discretionary; (b) the district court did not act 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards; or 
(c) the district court did not reach its decision through an exercise of reason.  Id.  NIR cannot meet its 
burden of proof. 
a. The District Court Understood Its Award Was Discretionary. 
 NIR contends that the district court failed to perceive its award of discretionary costs to 
Valiant as discretionary.  Valiant does not dispute that it would constitute an abuse of discretion if 
the district court failed to recognize that its decision was discretionary.  Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. 
v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 313, 109 P.3d at 167.  However, the district court clearly understood that its 
award of “discretionary costs” was discretionary in this case. 
The language that the district court utilized in its Memorandum Awarding Costs 
demonstrates that it recognized the award of discretionary costs to Valiant as discretionary.  
The district court ruled that it was “authorized” to award certain discretionary costs under the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  R.Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5838–39.  Moreover, the district court 
specifically analyzed and determined that certain discretionary costs were “necessary and 
exceptional, reasonably incurred and should in the interest of justice be awarded against [NIR].”  Id. 
at 5840–41 (emphasis added).  At no time did the district court indicate that it perceived the award of 
these costs was mandatory.  To the contrary, Judge Buchanan repeatedly referred to these costs as 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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“discretionary costs” throughout her Memorandum Awarding Costs.  The district court understood 
that its award to Valiant was discretionary.  NIR’s contention that the district court did not perceive 
this issue as a matter of discretion should be rejected.   
b. The District Court Acted Within the Boundaries of Its Discretion and 
Consistent With Applicable Legal Standards. 
 
i. The District Court Acted Within the Boundaries of Its Discretion. 
 
 A trial court abuses its discretion if it exceeds the limits of its discretion or acts in a manner 
inconsistent with applicable Idaho law.  Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 313, 
109 P.3d at 167.  A court “must make express findings as to why a party’s discretionary costs should 
or should not be allowed.”  Id. at 314, 109 P.3d at 168.  However, “[e]xpress findings as to the 
general character of requested costs and whether such costs are necessary, reasonable, exceptional, 
and in the interests of justice is sufficient to comply with this requirement.”  Id.  Moreover, 
the Idaho Supreme Court “has always construed the requirement that a cost be ‘exceptional’ under 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) to include those costs incurred because the nature of the case was 
itself exceptional.”  Id.  
 NIR asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to make any showing that 
the costs were exceptional and should, in the interests of justice, be assessed against NIR.  
Contrary to NIR’s contention, the district court made express findings as to the general character of 
each item of discretionary cost that it awarded and explained whether said costs were necessary, 
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 The district court held that “the scope and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary 
and exceptional costs which Valiant should be awarded in the interest of justice.”  Id., p. 5839.  
The district court further identified within a table items of discretionary costs that Valiant had 
requested and explained its determination that these items were “necessary and exceptional, 
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against defendants,” 
including NIR.  Id., pp. 5840–41.  The district court’s Memorandum Awarding Costs complied with 
the requirement that it make express findings as to the general character of requested costs and 
whether such costs met the requirements of Rule 54(d)(1)(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168.  As such, NIR’ arguments 
regarding the district court’s award of discretionary costs should be rejected. 
ii. The Award of Discretionary Costs Is Consistent With Applicable 
Legal Standards. 
 
 The Idaho Supreme Court “has always construed the requirement that a cost be 
exceptional . . . to include those costs incurred because the nature of the case was itself exceptional.” 
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168.  The determination of 
whether a particular case or even an individual cost is “exceptional” must be made by assessing 
“the context and nature of a case as a whole along with multiple circumstances.”  Hoagland v. 
Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900, 914, 303 P.3d 587, 601 (2013).  Factors that may be considered include, 
but are not limited to: the length and complexity of the litigation;2 whether the payment of certain 
                                                 
2 Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 169–70, 158 P.3d 937, 945–46 (2007). 
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costs could otherwise prohibit legitimate claims from being pursued;3 “whether there was an 
unnecessary waste of time, the frivolity of the issues presented, and creation of unnecessary costs that 
could have been easily avoided”; 4 and whether the conduct of one or more parties made the litigation 
exceptional or caused an exceptional amount of costs to be incurred.5  
 The district court determined that certain costs incurred by Valiant were necessary and 
exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and that they should, in the interest of justice, be assessed 
against the defendants, including NIR.  R.Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5839–41.  Only 25% of the 
discretionary costs were assessed against NIR.  The costs assessed against NIR were as follows: 
(1) $5,176.25 that Valiant incurred for a litigation guarantee identifying all persons with an interest 
in the one hundred fifty-six (156) parcels of real property that were foreclosed upon; (2) $601.01 that 
Valiant incurred, in excess of the $500.00 allowed as a matter of right, for scanning and copying the 
roughly 27,000 pages of documents produced during discovery; (3) $1,453.11 that Valiant incurred 
for traveling from Boise to Sandpoint to attend hearings necessitated by NIR’s unsupported motions; 
(4) $691.08 that Valiant incurred for postage expenses, courier costs, telephone expenses 
and computer assisted research; and (5) $344.23 that Valiant incurred for witness fees in excess of 
the $20.00 per day allowed as costs as a matter of right.  Id. 
                                                 
3 Id. 
4 Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho at 914, 303 P.3d at 601. 
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 NIR does not dispute that Valiant’s discretionary costs were necessary and 
reasonably incurred.  NIR instead argues that litigation guarantees, copy/scanning costs, 
travel expenses, excess witness fees, and other miscellaneous costs are commonly incurred in 
commercial litigation matters and, therefore, an award of said costs constitutes an abuse of discretion 
as a matter of law.  In support of its position, NIR cites to several cases in which this 
Court determined, under the particular facts and circumstances of said cases, that certain costs were 
typical and therefore not exceptional.  However, this Court has never held that any cost is so typically 
and ordinarily incurred as a matter of law that it cannot be awarded as a discretionary cost in 
any case.  To the contrary, this Court has emphasized that the determination of whether a cost is 
properly awardable as a discretionary cost must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case.  Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900, 914, 303 P.3d 587, 601 (2013).  Under the 
facts of this case, the award of discretionary costs to Valiant was appropriate and consistent with 
Idaho law. 
(1) The Nature of the Valiant Foreclosure Is Itself Exceptional. 
 
 The district court determined that the length, scope and complexity of the Valiant Foreclosure 
justified an award of discretionary costs in the interests of justice.  R.Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5838–41.  
The record amply supports this determination.  The Valiant Foreclosure has been litigated since the 
Complaint was filed on October 13, 2009.  R.Vol. I, p. 172.  Thus, the length of this case by itself is 
sufficient to justify the district court’s award of discretionary costs.  Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 
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at 169, 158 P.3d at 945 (“The district court also found that the costs were in the interests of justice 
because of the case’s length and complexity . . . .”).  
 The scope and complexity of the Valiant Foreclosure are also extraordinary.  This case 
required the parties to copy and analyze approximately 27,000 pages of real property records and 
other documents that were produced during discovery.  R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5840.  It further required 
the district court to adjudicate the priority of the Valiant Mortgages vis a vis the recorded interests of 
twenty-eight (28) other parties with respect to one hundred fifty-six (156) parcels of real property 
located within The Idaho Club.  See R.Vol. VI, pp. 739–67; R.Vol. XLIV, pp. 5317–5412; 
R.Vol. XLV, pp. 5413–5502.  This case was vigorously litigated for approximately seven (7) years 
before Valiant was awarded a monetary judgment in the amount of $21,485,212.26.  R.Vol. XLV, 
pp. 5413–16.  Thus, the scope and complexity of this case justified the district court’s award of 
discretionary costs.  Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho at 169, 158 P.3d at 945. 
 The conduct of the parties also justified the district court’s award of discretionary costs 
to Valiant.  The district court’s determination was based at least in part upon the conduct of NIR.  
The district court’s Memorandum Awarding Costs states, “[a]lthough this [c]ourt has found no 
frivolous conduct on the part of the defendants, at several of those hearings, counsel for one or more 
defendants presented oral arguments not supported by any legal authority or raised issues and claims 
that had already been decided on summary judgment.”  R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5840.  The district court 
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[B]ecause Valiant had to defend against multiple motions for 
reconsideration by the defendants, some of which contained claims 
unsupported by any legal authority or that had already been 
determined on summary judgment, the [c]ourt finds certain other 
costs were also necessary and exceptional and reasonably incurred, 
and in the interest of justice should be assessed against 
the defendants. 
 
Id., p. 5841.  Thus, the conduct of NIR also made the case exceptional and/or caused an exceptional 
amount of costs to be incurred.  Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 
153 Idaho 716, 729–30, 291 P.3d 399, 412–13 (2012).  NIR refused to acknowledge the priority of 
the Valiant Mortgages despite: (a) expressly subordinating to the RE Loans Mortgage; 
(b) subsequently releasing its purported Vendor’s Lien in its entirety; and (c) being collaterally 
estopped from asserting that NIR is owed anything pursuant to said Lien.  R.Vol. XXII, p. 2573; 
R.Vol. XXIV, pp. 2872–73.  Moreover, NIR filed and argued a motion to reconsider that did not 
seek to alter any part of the district court’s decision affecting NIR.  R.Vol. XXVI, pp. 3114–32.  
Thus, the district court considered the frivolity of the issues presented by NIR and whether NIR’s 
conduct resulted in an unnecessary waste of time and/or caused Valiant to incur unnecessary costs 
that could have been easily avoided.  Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho at 914 303 P.3d at 601.  
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(2) Valiant’s Discretionary Costs Were Incurred Because the 
Case Is Exceptional. 
 
 The district court awarded Valiant discretionary costs that were incurred because the nature 
of the case was itself exceptional.  Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 314, 
109 P.3d at 168.  The award of these costs was not an abuse of discretion and should not 
be overturned. 
The litigation guarantee is a necessary cost that Valiant reasonably incurred because of the 
exceptional size, scope and complexity of the real property issues in this case.  As repeatedly 
emphasized herein, this case involves the foreclosure of one hundred fifty-six (156) parcels of 
real property.  R.Vol. XLIV, pp. 5317–5412; R.Vol. XLV, pp. 5413–5502.  Moreover, no less than 
twenty-nine (29) parties, including Valiant, asserted a purported interest in all or a portion of 
these parcels.  R.Vol. VI, pp. 739–67.  Six (6) of the parcels are at least twenty (20) acres each, 
such that they comprise an area that is at least one hundred twenty (120) acres.  R.Vol. LXIII, 
p. 7717.  The remaining one hundred fifty (150) parcels are, for the most part, platted building lots 
with tax parcel identification numbers assigned by the Bonner County Assessor. Id., pp. 7715-7745.  
Thus, the real property foreclosed by Valiant easily exceeds two hundred (200) acres.  In order to 
foreclose upon the Valiant Mortgages, Valiant had to identify the real property that remained unsold 
or otherwise unreleased from the Valiant Mortgages, as well as every person or entity that had 
asserted an interest in these unreleased/unsold parcels.  Valiant incurred necessary and exceptional 
expenses in the amount of $20,705.00 to obtain a litigation guarantee that included this information.  
R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5839.  A litigation guarantee is not necessary in a typical foreclosure case as this 
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information can be obtained by a simple title search.  Valiant incurred the costs of a 
litigation guarantee only because of the exceptional size, scope and complexity of the real property 
at issue.  Moreover, only three parties contested the priority of the Valiant Mortgages.  By contesting 
priority, NIR knew that it was susceptible to an award of the costs as a matter of right and the 
discretionary costs Valiant incurred in this case.  The district court ordered that NIR was responsible 
to pay twenty-five percent (25%) of the cost Valiant incurred to obtain the litigation guarantee.  
This determination was not an abuse of discretion and should not be overturned. 
 The excess scanning costs Valiant was awarded are necessary costs, reasonably incurred 
because of the exceptional size, scope and complexity of the real property issues in this case.  
Over 27,000 pages of documents were produced in discovery because of the number of parties and 
parcels of real property that were the subject of the Valiant Foreclosure.  R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5840.  
A typical foreclosure case does not involve anywhere near this many documents.  Valiant incurred 
$1,803.03 in excess copy costs to scan/copy, exhibit stamp and code these documents.  
R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5839.  These excess copy costs were only incurred because of the exceptional size, 
scope and complexity of the real property at issue.  By contesting the priority of the 
Valiant Mortgages, NIR knew that it was susceptible to an award of the discretionary costs Valiant 
incurred in this case.  The district court ordered that NIR was responsible to pay twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the excess copy costs Valiant incurred.  This determination was not an abuse of discretion 
and should not be overturned. 
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 The travel costs Valiant was awarded are necessary costs, reasonably incurred because of the 
largely unsupported motions filed and argued by NIR in this case.  NIR contested the priority of the 
Valiant Mortgages even though it had no factual or legal bases to do so.  NIR expressly subordinated 
its Vendor’s Lien to the RE Loans Mortgage.  R.Vol. XXII, pp. 2572–74.  NIR thereafter released 
said Vendor’s Lien in its entirety.  Id.  Moreover, another district court had already adjudicated that 
the Vendor’s Lien had been fully satisfied, such that NIR was collaterally estopped from asserting 
that its alleged Vendor’s Lien had priority over the Valiant Mortgages.  Id.; R.Vol. XXIV, 
pp. 2871-73.  Nonetheless, Valiant incurred costs in the amount of $5,815.42 traveling from Boise, 
Idaho to Sandpoint, Idaho to argue at hearings in opposition to defendants’ unsupported motions.  
R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5839.  The district court determined that it was necessary for Valiant to attend 
these hearings in person and not by telephone.  Id., p. 5840.  The district court ordered that NIR was 
responsible to pay twenty-five percent (25%) of Valiant’s travel expenses because they were incurred 
due to NIR’s unsupported motions and arguments.  Id.  These are unnecessary costs that could easily 
have been avoided if NIR had not continued to contest the priority of the Valiant Mortgages without 
any factual or legal bases to do so.  Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho at 914, 303 P.3d at 601.  
The district court’s award of these costs to Valiant was not an abuse of discretion and it should not 
be overturned.   
 Valiant incurred miscellaneous litigation costs for postage expenses, courier costs, 
telephone expenses and computer assisted research totaling $2,764.32.  The district court determined 
that Valiant was entitled to an award of a portion of these costs incurred because of NIR’s 
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unsupported motions and arguments.  R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5841.  As set forth hereinabove, this award 
was not an abuse of discretion and should not be overturned.   
Valiant incurred witness fees in excess of the $20.00 allowed as costs as a matter of right.  
These excess costs totaled $1,376.93.  The district court ordered NIR to pay twenty-five percent 
(25%) of these costs because of the size, scope and complexity of this case.  Id., p. 5840.  As set 
forth hereinabove, this award was not an abuse of discretion and should not be overturned.  
C. The District Court Properly Awarded Valiant Costs As A Matter Of Right. 
 
 NIR asserts that the district court abused its discretion by awarding Valiant certain costs as a 
matter of right.  This assertion should be rejected. 
 Rule 54(d)(1)(A) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure entitles the prevailing party to recover 
certain costs incurred as a matter of right.  Moreover, Rule 54(d)(1)(B) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides that the trial court “may apportion the costs between and among the parties 
in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in 
the action . . . .”  The costs that the prevailing party is entitled to recover as a matter of right are 
set forth in Rule 54(d)(1)(C) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.   
 NIR does not contend that any of the costs that Valiant was awarded as a matter of right are 
costs that are not awardable as such under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  To the contrary, 
NIR only contends that the costs that Valiant was awarded are not awardable against NIR.  
However, NIR does not cite to any case law, statute, treatise or other legal authority to support 
its position.  NIR does not cite to the record, court transcript or otherwise identify the factual bases 
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for its assignment of error by the district court.  Nor does NIR make any effort to explain or 
otherwise set forth a cogent argument as to why or how the district court abused its discretion or 
acted in a manner inconsistent with Idaho law.    
 Rule 35(a)(6) of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides that an appellant’s argument 
“shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, 
the reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record 
relied upon.”  Id.   The Idaho Supreme Court will not consider an issue not “supported by argument 
and authority in the opening brief.”  Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 323, 
297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (2013).  Moreover, “if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported 
by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered.”  Id.  “A general attack on the findings 
and conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, 
is insufficient to preserve an issue.”  Id.   The Idaho Supreme Court does not search the record on 
appeal for error.  Id.  “To the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in 
compliance with the Idaho Appellate Rules, it is deemed to be waived.”  Id. 
 NIR has failed to cite to the record or any legal citation to support its contention that the 
district court abused its discretion in ordering NIR pay Valiant twenty-five percent (25%) of the costs 
that it incurred as a matter of right.  As such, NIR has waived any argument that the district court 





RESPONDENT’S BRIEF | Page 23 
I:\10482.006\PLD\Brief 180109.docx 
D. Attorneys’ Fees On Appeal. 
 Valiant requests attorneys’ fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121 and the corresponding 
procedural mechanism, Idaho Appellate Rule 41, because NIR’s appeal was brought frivolously, 
unreasonably and without foundation.  Idaho Code § 12-121 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case 
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation.  
 
Idaho Code § 12-121.  
An award of attorneys’ fees to Valiant is supported by: (1) Lower Payette Ditch Company v. 
Harvey, 152 Idaho 291, 271 P.3d 689 (2012); (2) Wechsler v. Wechsler, No. 44297 
(Idaho December 6, 2017); and (3) Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Lower Payette Ditch Company presented this Court with one issue on appeal:  Whether the 
district court abused its discretion by refusing to award attorneys’ fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 
because neither party had prevailed.  152 Idaho at 295, 271 P.3d at 693.  The Harveys, who had 
requested attorneys’ fees below, appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees, and this Court affirmed the 
district court’s discretionary decision.  Id.  This Court concluded that the Harveys’ assertions on 
appeal were proven false by: (1) simply reading the record; and (2) relevant case law.  Id.  
Lastly, and most importantly, this Court awarded the ditch company attorneys’ fees on appeal 
under Idaho Code § 12-121 after finding that the Harveys “simply asked us to second-guess the 
district court’s exercise of discretion without presenting any reasoned argument from which we could 
conclude that the district court abused its discretion.”  Id. at 297, 271 P.3d at 695.  
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Similar to the Harveys’ appeal in Lower Payette Ditch Company, NIR’s appeal lacks any 
reasoned argument and merely asks this Court to second-guess the district court’s exercise 
of discretion.  There are two specific similarities between the Harveys’ appeal and NIR’s appeal. 
First, in both appeals, the appellants’ arguments were refuted by “simply reading” the record.  
For example, in Lower Payette Ditch Company, this Court stated that the Harveys’ argument—that 
the ditch company did not recover any relief in the litigation—was proven false by “[s]imply reading 
the provisions of the settlement.”  Id. at 296, 271 P.3d at 694.  Similarly, NIR’s argument—
the district court’s award was an abuse of discretion—is proven false by the Memorandum 
Awarding Costs, wherein the district court demonstrated that it: (1) perceived the decision 
as discretionary; (2) acted consistent with the applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision 
through an exercise of reason by recognizing the overall complexity of the action.  R.Vol. XLVIII, 
p. 5829–43. 
Second, in both appeals, the appellants’ arguments were undermined by relevant case law. 
For example, in Lower Payette Ditch Company, this Court stated that the Harveys’ argument was 
clearly refuted by case law.  Id. at 296, 271 P.3d at 694 (citing Collins v. Jones, 131 Idaho 556, 559, 
961 P.2d 647, 650 (1998)).  Similarly, NIR’s argument—that certain costs did not qualify as 
discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)(1)(D)—is refuted by this Court’s holding in Hayden Lake Fire 
Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005) (“This Court has always 
construed the requirement that a cost be ‘exceptional’ under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) to include those 
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costs incurred because the nature of the case was itself exceptional.”), overruled on other grounds by 
Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 152 Idaho 495, 497, 272 P.3d 467, 469 (2012). 
In Wechsler v. Wechsler, this Court awarded attorneys’ fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 
because “[t]he facts and procedural nature of this case support[ed] Sharon’s contention that 
Norman’s sole purpose was to cause her to incur additional legal fees and to prolong this litigation to 
evade collection of the judgments against him.  Norman’s appeal amounts to nothing more than 
continued delay and evasive action.”  No. 44297 at *23 (Idaho December 6, 2017).  Similarly, 
NIR’s appeal of the award of costs, which are minuscule when compared to the overall value of the 
disputed property, is merely an attempt to prolong this litigation.  Practically speaking, so long as the 
disputed property is subject to a pending legal claim (even an appeal of costs), NIR’s Vendor’s Lien 
continues to encumber the real property it describes.  It appears that NIR is aware of this fact and is 
seeking to hamstring Valiant by appealing the award of costs.   
Lastly, NIR’s appeal is unreasonable in light of its failure to file a timely objection to 
Valiant’s memorandum of costs, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  
In sum, in the event that Valiant prevails on appeal, Valiant requests attorneys’ fees on appeal under 
Idaho Code § 12-121 because NIR’s appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably and 














 NIR has failed to establish that the district court’s award of discretionary costs to Valiant was 
an abuse of discretion.  The bases in law and fact, and the record herein all evidence that the 
district court: (1) understood and perceived its award of discretionary costs to Valiant as a matter 
of discretion; (2) established that said costs were exceptional and should be awarded to Valiant in the 
interests of justice; and (3) reached its determination through an exercise of reason.  
NIR’s arguments are without merit and should be rejected, and Valiant should be awarded 
attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal.  
 
 Respectfully submitted this 10th day of January 2018. 
 
McCONNELL WAGNER SYKES & STACEY PLLC 
 
 
                              /s/  Richard L. Stacey                              
      By: Richard L. Stacey, Attorneys For 
       Cross-Claimant/Respondent  
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of January 2018, a true and correct copy of the 
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Susan P. Weeks, Esq. 
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d’Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone:  208.667.0683 
Facsimile:   208.664.1684 
Counsel For VP Incorporated/North Idaho Resorts 
[  ] U.S. Mail 
[  ] Hand Delivered 
[  ] Facsimile  
[  ] Overnight Mail 
[  ] Electronic Mail 
sweeks@jvwlaw.net 
Gary A. Finney, Esq. 
John A. Finney, Esq. 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Telephone:  208.263.7712 
Facsimile:   208.263.8211 
Counsel For J.V., LLC  
[  ] U.S. Mail 
[  ] Hand Delivered 
[  ] Facsimile  
[  ] Overnight Mail 






                              /s/  Richard L. Stacey                      
      Richard L. Stacey 
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THIS ~fATTER came before the Court on August 17, 2016, for a hearing on Valiant 
Idaho, LLC's Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees and the objections thereto. Valiant 
Idaho, LLC ("Valiant'') is represented by Richard L. Stacey, of MCCONNELL WAGNER 
SYKES & STACEY, PLLC. JV, LLC ("JV") is represented by Gary A. Fmney, of FOOfEY 
Flli'NEY & FINNEY, P.A. North Idaho Resorts, LLC ('~NIR ') and v'P, Incorporated ('"VP") are 
represented by Susan P. Weeks, and David M. Keyes, of JAl\tIES, VERl 0 1 & Vr'EEKS, P.A. 
rv, NIR and \lP are referred to collectively herein as '"defendants." 
1\IIEMORANDUM DECISION A..'ID ORDER - 1 
5829 
NOW, THEREFORE, upon consideration, and pursuant to Rule 54(d)(6) and (e)(7) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court hereby settles the dollar amount of the costs and 
attorneys' fees to be awarded to Valiant in this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This leng"Jiy lawsuit has t"wo parts: Tne fust part is referred to herein as the "Genesis 
Suit." T'.a.e defendants named in the Genesis Suit included RE Loans, LLC, Pensco Trust Co., 
Mortgage Fund '08, LLC (collectively, "'Idaho Club Lenders"), and others. Genesis' complaint 
sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien it recorded to secure amounts it was allegedly owed for 
work performed in the construction of the Idaho Club golf course. Cross-claims and 
counterclaims were alleged by several defendants. The Idaho Chili Lenders successfully 
defended the priority of their respective Mortgages against all of these claims and cross-claims. 
The second part is referred to herein as the "Valiant Foreclosure." On August 19, 2014, 
Valiant amended its Answer in the Genesis Suit to include cross-claims and a Third Party 
Complaint to establish the amounts Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC C'POBD") owed to 
the Idaho Club Lenders a..7.d to foreclose the 2007 RE Loans Mortgage, the Pensco Mortgage, 
and l\11P08 -Nlortgage (collectively, ,_..Valiant Mortgages") to recover these amounts. After 
multiple summary judgments, several motions to reconsider, and a bi:fi.rrcated four ( 4) day bench 
trial, this Court determined that the V al:iant l f rtgages are valid first, second and/or third priority 
liens recorded against the Idaho Club Property; it awarded Valiant a Judgment in the amount of 
$21,485,212.261 against POBD; and it awarded Valiant a Decree of Foreclosure entitling Valiant 
to sell the Idaho Club Property to recover the amounts V alia..'1.t is owed pursuant to t.lie Judgment. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION Ai~"'D ORDER- 2 
5830 
IL DISCUSSION 
A. Valiant is the Prevailing Party in This Case. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l) provides, in part: 
(B) Prevaili.-"Jg Partv.. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing 
party and entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound discretion, 
consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties. The trial court may determine that a party to an 
action prevailed in part and did not prevail in pa.:'i, and on so finding may 
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner 
after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the 
resulting judgment or judgments obtained. 
I.R.C.P. 54{d)(l)(B). (Emphasis supplied). 
Valiant prevailed on all of its claims, and in defending itself against all of the cross-
claims and affirmative defenses raised by JV, ~lR and ·vp in this case. The Valiant .Mortgages 
were adjudicated. to be first, second and/or third priority liens recorded against the Idaho Club 
Property. Valiant obtained a Judgment in the amount of $21,485,212.262 against POBD a..'1.d a 
Decree of Foreclorure entitling it to sell the Idaho Club Property to pay the Judgment. Tne 
claims and affirmative defenses of JV, NIR. and ·vp were rejected. Accordingly, this Court, in 
the exercise of its discretion, finds that Valiant is t.'le prevailing pa..rty in this action. 
This prevailing party analysis is unique to thls case, and does not necessarily apply to the 
other Idaho Club Lawsuits described in Valiant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees. 
See Valiant Idaho, LLC's lvfemorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees (filed July 6, 2016), at 2-5. 
Consequently, this Court does not interpret Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 as authorizing an 
award to Valiant in this case of the fees and costs it incmred in the other Idaho Club Lawsui .. s. 
1 plus post-judgment interest at the rate of 5.625% per annum. 
z ibid. 
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B. Valiant Is Entitled To A.n Award of Costs and Attorneys' Fees Against POBD 
Pursuant to the Valiant l\'Iortgages. 
1. ]Ras-is fer the Awarrl 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e) provides, in part: 
(1) P1.n;s.nant to Contract er S-tam:te. In any civil action the court may award 
reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or 
parties as defined in Rule 54( d)(l )(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). (Emphasis supplied). 
Under the rerms of the Valiant Mortgages, Valiant is entitled to an award of its legal 
expenses, including cou...'1: costs and reasonable attorneys' fees that it in.cu._rred in the foreclosure 
action against POBD. Each of the Valiant !vfortgages has language entitling it to recover these 
fees and costs from POBD, and also, securing POBD's obligation to pay t.½.ese fees and costs. 
Specifically, paragraph 4.9 of the 2007 RE Loans Mortgage (Plaintiff's Ex. 1), Pensco 
Mortgage (Piaintift' s Ex. 16), and 1-fF 08 Mortgage (PlaiI1.tiff' s Ex. 18) provides: 
The prevailing party in any legal action brought by one party against the 
other and arising out of this :Mortgage or the Note shall be entitled to, in 
addition to any other rights and remedies he may have, to reimbursement for 
their expenses including court costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
Id. (Emphasis supplied). This provision obligates POBD to reimburse Valiant for all reasonable 
attorneys' fees and court costs it incurs in the Valiant Foreclosure. 
:Moreover, each of the Valia.11t Mortgages grants Valiant said mortgage "TO F..A \7E A.J.'IT) 
TO HOLD the Mortgaged Property for the purposes and uses herein expressed and FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF SEClJRThTG, in s-uch order of priority as Mortgagee may elect: ... 2. Due, 
prompt, and complete observance, performance, and discharge of all obligations of the 
~fortgagor under this Mortgage and any and all modifications, extensions or renewals of this 
r.A:ortgage." Plaintiff's Ex. 1, pp. 3-4, Plaintiffs Ex. 16, pp. 3-4, and Plaintiff's Ex. 18, pp. 3-4 
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( emphasis in original). Thus, POBD' s obligation to pay Valiant' s expenses, including court costs 
and reasonable attorneys' fees, is also secured by the Valiant :Mortgages. 
The secured obligations extend beyond those obligations set fort.h in paragraph 4.9 of the 
Valiant Mortgages. POBD is also obligated to forever warrant and defend the priority of 
Valiant' s interest in and title to the Idaho Club Property against any and all lien claims made by 
third parties. See paragraph 1.2 of the Valiant Mortgages, at Plaintiff's Ex. 1, p. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. 
16, p. 5, and Plaintiff's Ex. 18, p. 7. POBD must "'pay or reimburse Mortgagee for all reasonable 
expenses incurred by lvfortgagor before fu--id after the date of this Mortgage with respect to any 
an.d all actions, matters or transactions arising out of or related to the tbis Mortgage." 
Paragraph4.4 of the Valiant ~lortgages, at Plain.tiff' s Ex. 1, p. 15, Plaintiff's Ex. 16, p. 15, and 
Plaintiff's Ex. 18, p. 17 (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, POBD is also obligated to 'indemnify 
and hold ha..-rmless the Mortgagee from and against all claims, damages~ losses and liabilities 
(including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses) arising out of or based 
upon ally matter related to the i\'1ortgaged Property and the occupancy, ownership, 
maintenance, or management of the :Mortgaged Property by the lVIortgagor." Paragraph 4.5 
of the Valiant fortgages, at Plaintiffs Ex. 1, p. 15, Plaintiff's Ex. 16, pp. 15-16, and Plaintiff's 
Ex. 18, p. 17 ( emphasis supplied). These provisions obligate POBD to reimburse Valiant for all 
reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs it incurred in the Genesis Suit. 
Since all of the obligations of POBD are secured by the Valiant Mortgages, all expenses, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, inctnTed by Valiant and its 
predecessors-in-interest in this case are secured by the Valiant Mortgages. 
fo. sum, as the prevailing party, Valiant is entitled to an award of attorneys ' fees and costs 
against POBD under the terms of the Valiant Mortgages. POBD is obligated under the 
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Mortgages to reimburse Valiant for these fees and costs, and this obligation is secured by the 
Valiant !vfortgages. Hence, this secured obligation is prior in right, title and interest to any 
interest possessed by N, 1',;'IR or N. Accordingly, Valiant's award of attorneys' fees and costs 
against POBD shall be incorporated into the Judgment as part of Valiant' s first priority position 
pursuant to the 2007 RE Loans Mortgage. 
2. Amount of the A ward 
Upon consideration of the Declaration of Richard L. Stacey in Support of Valiant Idaho's 
LLC's 1\-femorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees, filed July 6, 2016 (hereafter, "Stacey 
Dec."), and Valiant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees, tbis Cou.."1: finds reasonable, 
and awards against POBD, the following costs and fees: 
= -~ -· ~ ~~f.:.·--t~-~-~, ~~-~ ;, · '- • • ""ll~:11,; ~;!l ~~:( - •·-.- .• : · .•·. l 
-t' ~.i.W• ; ' . ::_ A • l: ~  • .~ -; ,. '/ ~ • ~ r•• • f : ._: :,: •, 
. . ,..,.,. ;· ~ - ::-i' ~;· -::.;_-;.·, ,. . ,/ 
. ~---· _.,___ 
Total Attorneys' Fees $ 146,853.00 
Total Costs As A Matter of Right $ 780.40 see Stacey 
Dec., Ex. 
A-2 
Total 0,,5cretiona..--y Costs $ l,312.24 see Id., Ex. 
A-3 
I TOTAL COSTS $ 148,945.64 
~-r.~:rr-.:-T":-~~- --,,~ ~ ~---~  
. ~~,, .. ;~_;:.,.~~,:.;,~-~-- ~:'~~~~~_. ~· :,?k'·~-~1'N'P~- -- ~-~ ~;~~t 9:- - - • _j 
I~~ . > ,__. _; t., ''/~t~,e:.,, _. ~- -,~ y,' . • 1~-r:d£li. :_:,:'.'-<: .;_·..., J 
-· ~~··· .... . ,.__,:..-"-"'~-•_:_ ~ • - )j"". ,,. --- .... ~-..t.----~-- -
Total Attorneys' Fees $ 579,460.50 
Total Costs As A Matter of Right $ 2,869.34 Actual fees 




Dec .. Ex. G-
I 4] 
' 
TOTAL COSTS $ 582,329,84 
The actual fees for service of pleadings or documents are being assessed against POBD 
instead of N , VP and NIR because Exhibit G-4 of the Stacey Dec. does not include any invoices 
for service on JV, VP or NI..~ and the defem:f~ts shall not be required to reimburse Valiant for 
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service on the numerous other parties in this matter. To avoid duplicate cost awards, and 
because POBD did not defend against the Valiant Foreclosure or participate adversely to Valiant 
at trial, the Court shall assess fae remaining costs as a matter of right and discretionary costs 
i--icurred by Valiant in the Valiant Foreclosure agai.'1St N, VP and NIR, and not against POBD. 
Accorclin!!lv. Valiant is aw::arded attornevs' fees and costs a2ainst POBD in the total 
amount of ($148.945.64 + $582.329.84) = $731,275.48, This amount shall be incoroorated into 
the Jud2:ment as !Dart 0.i v alia.nt s.mst prioritv positioap.msuant to the 2tl07 RE Loans wfurrga.£!:e. 
***** 
Because attorneys' fees and costs have been awarded to Valia.t7.t under the terms of the 
Valifu""'lt Mortgages, it is unnecessary to conduct a fee analysis under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
C. Valiant Is Not Entitled To An Award of Attorn-eys' Fees Against JV, 1'1--rR and v-P. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e) provides, in part: 
(2) Pmm.la:n to Eda.ho. C©de Section 12- l 2!. Attorney fees under Idaho Code 
Section 12-121 may be awarded by the court only when it finds that the case 
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation, which finding must be in writing and include the basis and 
reasons for the award. No attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 12-121 on a default judgment. 
LR.C.P. 54(e)(2). (Emphasis supplied). 
"An award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Idaho 1vlilitary Historical Sociery, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 
Idaho 624,629,329 P.3d 1072, 1077 (2014) (citation omitted). 
Similarly, "[t]he district court's determination as to whether an action was broug,.1.t or 
defended frivolously will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Id ( citation omitted). 
In Narnpa & Jrferidian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington. Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 
(2001), the Idaho Supreme Court set forth the standard for making this determination: 
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This Court has held that an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 is not 
a matter of right, and is appropriate only when the Court, in its discretion, 
"is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or 
brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Owner-Operator 
Ind Drivers Assoc. v. Idaho Public U.til. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 401 , 408, 871 P2d 
818, 825 (1994). Wllen deciding whether the case was brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the 
litigation must be taken into account. Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable 
issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 even 
though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. See Turner v. Willis, 119 Idaho 1023, 812 
P.2d 737 (1991). The award of attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the 
trial court and the burden is on the person disputing the award to show an abuse of 
discretion. See Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). 
Id. at 524-525, 20 P.3d at 708-709. (Emphasis supplied). 
Recently, in Idaho lvfilitary Historical Sociery, Inc. v. Maslen, su:pra, the Supreme Court 
attempted to clarify its ruling in Nampa & .Nferidian Irrigation Dist. , as follows: 
Unfortunately, the standard articulated in Nampa i'Jtferidian can lead 
to the result that a party who makes claims or defenses that are clearly 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation may avoid the consequences 
of that conduct and cast the burden of attorney fees on the other party, even 
if the overall '\liew of the case establishes the unreasonableness of the conduct 
requiring the lawsuit. Arguably, a single, triable issue of fact may excuse a party 
from the aggregate of misconduct that necessitates or dominates the conduct of 
the lawsuit. This Court does back away from and clarify the overly strict 
application of Idaho Code section 12-121 set forth in Nampa Meridian. 
Apportionment of attorney fees is appropriate for those elements of the case 
that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. Apportionment of 
costs and fees is common even for district courts, and this step back from the 
language of Nampa J.\lfer idian is consistent with the general principles of 
apportioning costs and fees. 
The record in this case is clear that litigation to obtain possession of the 
aircraft should never have been necessary. The litigation was necessitated by 
factual claims that were indefensible. The Plaintiff asserted some legal 
theories it could not prove. Those assertions were in response to factual 
claims by the Defendants that were unsupportable and which were known by· 
the Defendants to be unsupportable. The Defendants had no legitimate 
triable cfaims of fact on the question that necessitated the initiation of this 
action. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the attorney fees 
for the ciaims of tb.e Defendants necessitating this lawsuit that were frivolous, 
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unreasonable, and without adequate foundation. 
156 Idaho 624, 632, 329 P.3d 1072, 1080 (2014). (Emphasis supplied). 
Comparing the conduct of the defendants in this case with the conduct the district court 
found frivolous in Idaho }.1Blitary Historical Society, Inc., this Court finds as follows: In the 
Valiant Foreclosure, all the defendants asserted some legal theories they could not prove. One or 
more of the defendants made some factual claims that were unsupportable. The Court does not 
find that those claims v,,rere known by the defendants to be unsupportable. The issue at trial-
namely, whether Loan No. P0099 from RE Loans to POBD and Loan No. P0106 from Pensco 
Co. to POBD were satisfied at the closing of Loan No. P0106 from .Y.[F08 to POBD, or some 
time thereafter-arose out of a legitimate factual claim by the defl:ndants that the loans had been 
satisfied. The trial resulted in the production by Valiant of evidence that clearly and 
convincingly showed that the loans were not satisfied, and the amounts still due thereu..'1.der. 
Though some of the claims and defenses raised by rv, ITR and VP lacked any factual or 
legal basis, viewing the entire course of the litigation, this Court does not believe that Tv, NIR or 
VP defended this action frivolously, lnrreasonably, or without foundation. Absent such frivolous 
or unreasonable condu~ Valiant is not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees against them. 
D. Valiant is En-titled to Costs as a J\'Iatter of Right Against Jv~, l'l""IR and VP. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)( 1) provides, in part: 
(d) Costs. 
(1) In General; Items Allowed 
(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs 
are allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court. 
(C) Costs as a Matter of Right. Wnen costs are awarded to a party, that party is 
entitled to the following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right: ... 
LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(A), (C). (Emphasis supplied)_ 
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Rule 54{ d)(l )(A) and (C) of the Ida.ho Rules of Civil Procedure grant the prevailing party 
in a civil matter certain costs "as a matter of right." Valiant prevailed in the Valiant Foreclosure 
against the claims and affirmative defenses raised by N, NIR and VP in motion practice and at 
trial. As sue~ Valiant is entitled to an award of these costs. Valiant's 1\-!emorandum of Costs 
and Attorneys' Fees and the Stacey Dec. itemize the costs incurred by Valiant that are expressly 
authorized under Rule 54(d)(l)(C). These include certain court filing fees, service of process 
fees, deposition and transcript fees, witness fees, witness travel expenses, preparation of trial 
exhibits, and expert witness fees that V alian.t incurred in this case. 
Upon consideration, this Court finds reasonable the following costs as a matter of right: 
a. Court Filing Fees $ 86.00 
[see Stacey Dec.:, Exs. A-2, G-21 
b. Witness fees (S20.00 per day; $.30 mileag-e) actually paid for 
each day the following witnesses testified at deposition or at 
trial 
Casey Linscott TriaJ - $20.30 $ 20.30 
Barney Ng Trial - $20.00 
[see Stacey Dec., Ex. G-51 
c. Expenses of certified copies of documents admitted as $ 158.50 
evidence in hearings or at trial {see Stacey Dec., Ex G-5] 
d. Costs of preparing models, maps, pictures, photographs, or $ 500.00 
other exhibits not to exceed $500.00 for each party [see Stacey 
Dec., Ex G-5/StreamlineJ 
e. Charges for reporting and transcribing all depositions and $ 8,250.19 
charges for one copy of every deposition taken 
{see Stacey Dec., Ex D-2, Ex G-6] 
E. Valiant is Entitled to an Award of Discretionary Costs Against JV, NIR and VP. 
Rule 54( d)(l )(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes this Court to award the 
prevailing party "[a]dditional items of cost not enumerated~ or in an amount L11 excess of that 
listed in subpart (C), . . . on a sho"'Ni.ng that foe costs were necessary and exceptional costs, 
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reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse 
party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) (emphasis supplied). As the prevailing party, Valiant seeks an 
award of its discretionary costs against N, v'P and NIR. as itemized in Valiant's Nlemorandum 
of Costs and Attorneys' Fees and the Stacey Dec. The defendants have filed objections thereto. 
Upon consideration, this Court finds necessary and ex eptional and reasonably incurred 
the following discretionary costs: 
a. Litigation Guarantee for foreclosure actioo $ 20,705.00 
fsee Stacey Dec., Ex. G-12J 
a. Wttness fees aclnaJly incurred in excess of the $20.00 per s 1,376.93 
witness per day allowed as a. matter of right 
fsee Stacey Dec., Ex G-11 - Barney NgJ 
b. Costs of scanning, exhibit stamping, <:opying, and coding and 
preparing models, maps, pictures, photographs, or other 
exhibits for use at trial in excess of the $500.00 per party $ 588.55 
allowed as a matter of right 
{see Stacey Dec.~ Ex. G-10] 
C. Electronic discovery costs for documents not used as exhibits $ 182.61 
at trial [see Stacey Dec., Ex. A-3J 
d. In-House photocopy expenses {see Stacey Dec., Ex. A-3] $ 351.30 
e. Out-sourced p.hotocopy expenses, and costs of copies $ 680.57 
reimbursed to third parties [see stacey Dec., Exs. A-3, G-10] 
f. Postage $ 76.86 [see Stacey Dec., Ex. G-7J 
FedEx $ 532.82 [see Stacey Dec., Exs. A-3, G-7] $ 653.oS 
Couriers: S 44.00 [see Stacey Dec., Ex G-8] 
g. Long distance telephone and conference call charges $ 239.58 
{see Stacey Dec., Exs. A-3~ G-9] 
h. . Travel expenses for counsel [see Stacey Dec., Ex. G-11] $ 5,815.42 
i. Computer-assisted research {see Stru:ey Dec., Exs. A-2, G-2] $ 1,871.06 
The Court finds that the scope and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary and 
exceptional costs which Valiant should be awarded in the interests of justice, because these are 
costs which Valiant had to expend to fully litigate this matter but which are not contemplated by 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11 
5839 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as costs as a matter of right. Specifically: 
1. The witness fees Valiant paid in excess of the $20.00 per day were necessary and 
exceptional, reasonably incu..-rred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed agairu,i: 
the defendants 
2. This case required the scanning and copying of thousands of pages of documents. tvfr. 
Stacey estimates that approximately 27,000 documents were produced in discover;; 
nearly 200 documents were scanned into exhibits for trial; and hard copies of all exhibits 
were required for the witnesses and record at trial. These costs were necessary and 
exceptional, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against 
the defendants. 
3. In order to ensure that every person or entity w · an int rest in the Idaho Club Property 
was named as a defendant in t.½e Valiant Foreclosure, Valiant obtained and paid for a 
Litigation Guai.antee. This Litigation Guarantee was critical to the foreclosure action, and 
the Court finds that it was a necessai.--y and exceptional cos~ reasonably incurred, and 
should in foe interest of justice be assessed against the defendants. 
4. Counsel for Valiant is located in Boise, Idaho. Valiant incuned significant travel 
expenses to and from the multiple hea.T1I1gs that were necessary in the Valiai.7.t 
Foreclosure_ Although this Court has found no frivolous conduct on the part of the 
defendants, . at several of those hearings, counsel for one or more of the defendants 
presented oral arguments not supported by a.."ly legal authority or raised issues and claims 
that had already been determined on summary judgment. Because of the complexity of 
the case, it was necessary for counsel to appear in person and not by telephone. Thus, 
the Court finds these travel costs were necessary and exceptional, reasonably incurred, 
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and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the defendants. 
5. Similarly, because Valiai1.t had to defend against multiple motions for reconsideration by 
the defendants, some of which contained claims unsupported by any legal authority or 
that had already been determined on summary judgment, the Cou..rt finds certain other 
cost..s were also necessary and exceptional and reasonably incurred, and in the interest of 
justice should be assessed against the defendants. They include Valiant's (i) outsourced 
photocopy expenses; (ii) in-house photocopy expenses; (iii) postage expenses; 
(iv; courier costs; ( v) telephone expenses; and (vi) cost of computer-assisted research. 
Based on the fure.2:oing_ Valiant is an awarded costs a.!2:amst N . Y-P and N1R iB the total 
amount of {$9.014.99 + $32.464.70) = $41.479.69. 
F. App-0rtionment of Award of Costs Betiveen JV, ~"'IR and VP. 
Tne Cou..-rt is authorized by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 to apportion costs between 
the defendants. Recognizing that N1R pazticipated in pre- and post-trial motion practice, but not 
in the court trial, this Court apportions the costs as follows: 
L NIR. is responsible for 0.25 of $41,479.69 = $10,369.933 
2. JV is respons·ble for 0.375 of$41,479.69 = $15,554.88 
3. VP is responsible for 0.375 of $41,479.69 = $15,554.88 
ID. CONCLUSION A,,1'© ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Valiant is avvarded attorn ys' fees and costs against POBD in the total amount of 
$73i,275.48. This amount shall be incorporated into the Judgment as part of 
MEMORAl'l'DUM DECISION Al.~1) ORDER - 13 
5841 
Valiant' s first priority position pursuant to t.1.e 2007 RE Loans Mortgage. 
2. Valiant is awarded costs against NIR in the amount of $10,369.93 
3. Valiant is awarded costs against JV in the amount of $15,554.88 
4. Valiant is awarded costs against VP in the amount of $15,554.88 
ITIS SO ORDERED. 




3 The exact value is $1 iJ ,369. 92, but 1he Court has added $.01 to this value to take into account the rounding of the 
numbers and to ensure that the contribu:tioas from each defendanr, added together, total $41,479.69. 
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(Attorneys for For JV., LLC) 
Susan P. Weeks 
Daniel l\.-f. Keyes 
JANIBS, VER1 ON & VlEEKS, PA 
1626 Lincoln Way 




(Attorneys for VP, Incorporated/North Idaho Resorts, LLC) 
Fichard L. Stacey 
Jeff R. Sykes 
Chad M. Nicholson 
McCONNELL WAG ffiR SYKES 
& ST ACEY, PLLC. 
827 East Park Boulevar~ Suite 201 





(Attorney for R.E. Loans, LLC; and Valiant Idaho, LLC) 
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STATE OF i· /l. , ·, 
C0! 1 'TY F 80 NE '"! 
F ... r Ju0tc1.,~L 01ST?. c r 
2016 AJJG 22 PH 3~ l+ I 
CLERK DiSTR!C T CO Llff( 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN M'D FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
GEl'l"ESIS GOLF BlJILDERS, INC., formerly 
known as NATIONAL GOLF BUILDERS, 
INC., a Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PEl'i'D OREILLE BONNER DKVELOPl\lIENT, 
LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, et al , 
Defendants. 
A..~'D RELATED COUNTER, CROSS AND 
THlRD PARTY ACTIONS PREVIOUSLY 
FILED HEREIN 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
) 
) 
) CASE NO. CV-2009-0001810 
) 
) .IT,1DG:MENT re: 












1. Valiant Idfu½.o, LLC is awarded costs and attorneys ' fees against Pend Oreille Bonner 
Development, LLC, in the amount of $731,275.48. This amount shall be incorporated 
into the Judgment as part of Valiant' s first priority position pursuant to the 2007 
RE Loans :Mortgage. 
2. Valiant Idaho, LLC is awarded costs against North Idaho Resorts, LLC in the amount 
of $10,369.93. 
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3. Valiant Idaho, LLC is awarded costs against N, LLC in the amount 0£$15,554.88. 
4. Valiant Idaho, LLC is awarded costs against VP, Incorporated in the amount of 
$15,554.88. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this J '.? day of August, 2016. 
Barbara 'iiucllanan 
District Judge 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid 
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Gary A. Finney 
FINNEY FIN"NEY & FlNNEY, PA 
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(Attorneys for For JV, LLC) 
Susan P. Weeks 
Daniel M. Keyes 
JAl.v.IES, VERNO & WEEKS, PA 
1626 Lincoln Way 




(Attorneys for v--P, Incorporatecl/North Idaho Resorts, LLC) 
Richard L. Stacey 
JeffR. Sykes 
Chad M. Nicholson 
McCONNELL WAG~"'ERSYKES 
& STACEY, PLLC. 
827 East Park Boulevard, Suite 201 





(Attorney for R.E. Loans, LLC; and Valiant Idaho; LLC) 
Deputy Clerk 
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